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Introduction  
 
This paper is a modest attempt to study legal pluralism in rural China using rural legal 
services as a case study. The paradox of the provision of legal service in rural China is 
the conflicting imperatives between providing localized services at the grass-roots level 
and the lure of legal professionalism. The greatest strength of rural legal service providers 
is the way they are embedded in the rural social and political setting, the geographic and 
social proximity to villagers, the personal touch in their work, and the trust they obtained 
from their clients based on personal knowledge of the rural communities where they 
serve. Simply put, there is a particular legal need, and rural legal service providers 
effectively fill the gap.  
 
There are strong ideological and economic forces which pull the rural legal service 
providers away from their grass-roots. The calling of an emerging legal professionalism 
(and the related financial incentives) demands a certain degree of legal knowledge and 
qualification, rules of procedures, code of conduct and regularity in legal practice. 
Gradually, there is a separation between the public legal service providers and private 
legal service providers in the Chinese countryside. In order to survive in an increasingly 
competitive legal market (even in rural areas), rural legal service providers have to run 
legal practices as a business, considering the “bottom  line”  and  following  the  logic  of  a  
legal market. There is a tendency to merge and consolidate small services providers to 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2063115
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create an economy of scale and maintain competitiveness. This ideological and economic 
imperative requires rural services providers to cluster in the county seat or larger market 
towns, moving away from their grass-roots basis. Rural legal service providers are torn 
between a service idea and a profit-making (survival) motive. 
 
It is an important policy issue to strike a proper balance between public and private 
delivery of legal service in the Chinese rural areas. First of all, rurality1 creates natural 
barriers for rural residents in limiting the availability of public services including legal 
services. There is an inherent spatial inequality for rural population when it comes to the 
distribution of legal service and the geographic isolation and remoteness nurture a 
particular type of legal culture among rural residents.2 The problem is structural and  
improvement in delivery through information technology, such as email, has had only 
limited impact. Secondly, private delivery of legal service is costly, ineffective and not 
sustainable. The legal market, in terms of the number and kinds of cases and the fees that 
can generated from them, is simply too marginal for private practitioners. Legal service 
clusters in commercial centers and there is an apparent market failure. Thirdly, to correct 
the market failure, the government would need to steps-in to provide or supplement legal 
service in rural areas by introducing a public dimension of legal services. Politics may 
ameliorate where the legal service market fails. Justice without courts  
 
 
This paper offers a glimpse of this tension by examining rural legal service in Chongqing, 
Hunan and Sichuan. The research builds on the legal aid project activities in Hunan and 
Chongqing. From 2007 to date, I traveled to the project counties to organize meetings, 
focus groups and workshops on rural legal service on numerous occasions, working 
closely with Zhongnan University School of Law in Hunan and the Department of 
Politics and Law of Sanxia College (Sanxia College) in Chongqing. To collect more 
systematic data, we organized and trained 15 law students in Hunan and 12 law students 
                                                          
1 “Rurality” is well-defined and can be clearly identified in the Chinese case where an identified group of 
people are bound to make their living by laboring on land in well-structured communities.   
2 Mark Blacksell,   “Social   justice   and   access   to   legal   services:   a   geographical   perspective”   (1990)   21(4)  
Geoforum 489-502; Kim Economides, Mark Blacksell and Charles Watkins,  “The  spatial  analysis  of  legal  
systems:  towards  a  geography  of  law”  (1986)  13  Journal of law and Society 161-181.   
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in Chongqing as assistants in the two localities to conduct in-depth interviews in their 
hometowns. The interviews took place during the Chinese New Year holidays in 2010. 
Interviews in Chongqing are directly supervised by a teaching staff of Sanxia College 
who also participated in the interviews. Interviews in Chongqing are more open ended 
and those in Hunan are more structured following interview questionnaires. We 
interviewed 36 county lawyers and 43 legal workers in Hunan; and 11 legal workers and 
26 heads and staff members in Justice Stations.  
 
Rural Legal Services: History and Institutional Framework 
 
There are currently two tiers of legal service providers at the rural county level in China 
and, within each tier, there are both a public component and a private component. The 
upper and professional tier includes legal service rendered by lawyers and staff members 
in government-run legal aid centers and the delivery by practicing lawyers in private law 
firms. A county legal aid center is located within the Bureau of Justice (BoJ) to which the 
legal aid centre is accountable, and law firms are uniformly located in the county seat as 
well, running legal practices with some government supervision. Private lawyers serve 
principally the urban section of the county population.     
 
The lower and less professional tier is found at the township level and less well defined. 
The lower tier generally includes, as official policy demands, a justice assistant (JA) (司
法助理员) — who is now a civil servant, and normally a man — heading a justice station 
(JS) (司法所). The JS is supported by the township government and works closely with 
the local police, and to a lesser degree court branches in solving disputes. 
Administratively, a JS is directly accountable to the BoJ of the locality where it is located, 
and a JA can be seen as the principal law officer of the township government.  
 
The duties of JAs have evolved over the years. The position of JA was created in the late 
1970s and early 1980s to enhance the governance capacity of the local government and to 
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develop socialist legality.3 The JA scheme was set up in each township in rural areas and 
with a street office in urban areas. Initially as township government officials, the 
principal responsibilities of JAs were to organize and guide mediation work which was in 
disarray during the social and economic transition; to train mediators; and to solve 
difficult disputes. Currently, the principal duties of JAs include: mediation of important 
cases; legal promotion and propaganda;4 guidance over legal service firms (法律服务所) 
as discussed below; provision of legal aid services; and community correction. Mediation 
of actual cases has become the most pressing and the pivotal task for JAs. Most of the 
JAs reported that over 50 per cent of their time is spent on mediating disputes. If legal 
service provision and legal aid services were added together, they would take up almost 
all of a  JA’s  time.  Typically,  a  JA  mediates  about  10  major  disputes  per  year,  which  are  
approximately 10 per cent of the cases a JA mediates directly or indirectly each year 
(HR04). 
 
While the JS was developing, a new legal service firm appeared in the countryside, 
mostly in the Southern part of China, to provide legal advice to rural enterprises. In 1984, 
the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) recognized and welcomed that spontaneous development. 
As a result, legal service firms started to grow in different parts of China. These firms 
appeared in different forms, with some being privately run, others attached to township 
governments and subsidized by the government, and most situated in-between. China was 
witnessing an emerging semi-private sector of legal service providers which was referred 
to as legal workers (法律服务工作者). That profession was permitted limited legal 
practice rights in all cases other than criminal cases of public prosecution in the county 
with which they register. As quasi-private legal practitioners, legal workers formed their 
own legal service firms and provided legal service on a partly fee-charging basis and 
partly based on government subsidies.  
 
                                                          
3 See the Provisional Measures on the Work of Judicial Assistants issued by the Ministry of Justice in 1981. 
See also, Fu  Hualing,   “The   Judicial   Assistant   System   in   Rural  Mainland  China”   (1992)   28(4)   Issues & 
Studies 25-45.   
4  
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Data from Hunan can illustrate the timeframe in the development of legal service firms in 
China. Among the legal service firms that were surveyed in Hunan, 36 legal service firms 
stated their establishment dates, among which 19 of the legal service firms were 
established in the 1990s, especially in the early 1990s; ten in the 1980s, with the earliest 
ones established in 1985 (HN019; HN024); and seven established in the 2000s, with the 
latest legal service firms set up in 2007-2008 (HN002; HN015). 
 
In 1987, the MoJ promulgated the Provisional Measures on Township Legal service firms 
(Provisional Measures) to regulate the profession, according to which, legal workers were 
recruited by the county BoJ to provide legal service in the respective townships. In 
addition to their private practice, legal workers were required to assist JAs in assisting 
people’s mediation and conducting legal propaganda. Importantly, the township 
government was requested to provide funding in case where legal service firms could not 
be self-sustainable financially. JAs, as a matter of rule, were legal workers and formed 
the core of legal workers, hence the merging of public and a private sectors. 
  
But the status of legal service firms was never clearly specified in the Provisional 
Measures, and indeed the MoJ in its explanatory note to the Provisional Measures 
refrained from defining the status. The MoJ stated that because of great local  variation,  “a  
decision on the legal status of legal service firms  would   be   deferred.”   It  was   not   until  
1990 that the MoJ clarified that legal service firms were not profit-making social 
organizations but part of the government structure.  
 
There were two additional changes of significance in developing and consolidating rural 
legal services in the 1990s. The first change was to promote the position of JA to the 
status of a civil servant made him directly accountable to the county BoJ. Before the 
promotion, JA was part of the township establishment with an uncertain status, and this 
uncertainty caused two problems to the detriment of rural legal service provision. A 
principal problem was the personnel instability of JAs. Since it was not a formal, well-
established post, township governments had the discretion to transfer a JA to another 
position. A promotion to the rank of civil servant with the BoJ served to promote the 
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status of Jas and to professionalize the post, making training and long-term planning 
more feasible. The second problem related to the duties of JAs. When the JA was a 
township post, township leaders required the JA to perform duties that were not law-
related (such as collecting taxes and levies and enforcing the one child policy). 
Townships have different priorities which may or may not fit within the official profile of 
JAs. As it happened, JAs were diverted from dispute resolution to other chores of the 
local governments. 
  
The second change in consolidating JAs was to institutionalize the post. The MoJ, as 
mentioned above, created the JSs towards the end of the 1980s, with a JA serving as the 
director of each JS. However, that organization was not officially established at the 
central government level and operated without additional personnel and budget. There 
was therefore no institutional separation between each JS and legal service firms, and 
both were centered around the office of the JA. The JA therefore developed two separate 
identities: organizing mediation in the capacity of a local government official; and giving 
legal advice and legal representation on a fee-charging basis as a private legal service 
provider. The MoJ, apparently satisfied with the merging of two entities in one 
institutional framework, enacted two important normative documents to govern the two 
entities, both in 2000, namely the Measures for the Administration of Grass-roots Level 
Legal service firms and the Measures for the Administration of Grass-roots Level Legal 
Workers. More importantly, in December 2000, the MoJ organized the first, and so far 
the only, national examination for legal workers. It is generally agreed that the climax of 
legal  service  firms’  development  was  mainly  between  1995  and  1999.     
 
The formal co-existence of legal service firms and JSs comes to a sudden end in 2000, a 
year which turned out to be crucial for the profession of legal workers. In September 
2000,   the   MoJ   issued   a   document   entitled   “The   Implementation   Opinions   on   the  
Delinking and Re-structuring of Grass-roots Legal service Agencies”,   announcing   that  
legal service firms would be delinked from the government and become partnership legal 
service firms based on the principles of self-governance, self-financing and self-
development. To facilitate the development of a second tier of the legal profession, the 
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MoJ was responding to a new State Council initiative in delinking all intermediary 
agencies from governmental departments. Legal service firms, not different law firms and 
accounting firms, were regarded as an intermediary, non-governmental, agency that 
should be socialized. By the early 2000s, the executive government was taking serious 
measures to reduce government interference in the economy and society by restricting the 
licensing power of the government. The delink took place in that larger context of 
government reform to develop a support structure for a market economy in China. 
 
Unexpectedly, the delinking brought a sharp decline in the number of legal workers and 
legal service firms, however. Most of the legal workers had only a meager income and 
were simply not in a position to become financially independent. The decision to delink 
was made in Beijing, with the encouragement and agitation of the professional lawyers, 
who feared competition from their barefoot counterparts,5 with no consultation with legal 
workers, who were not in a position to respond. The newly granted independence also 
came with a price – a socialized profession allowed government regulation of both legal 
workers and to charge a hefty registration fees for their licenses. To reduce the cost, legal 
workers created mega firms which may have more than a dozen of lawyers. Others 
simply continued to practice without registration.   
 
By the end of 2000 when delinking was announced, there were 34,219 legal service firms, 
a 1,164 decline from 1999; the number was reduced further to 28,647 in 2001. In 2001, 
the number of legal workers was 107,985, a decline of 13,919 from 2000.  The 
unintended consequence sent alarm to the MoJ in Beijing. By 2001, the MoJ clearly 
realized the crisis it was facing by implementing the delinking policy and announced a 
decision calling for caution in proceeding with the delinking. The MoJ pointed out that:  
 
…  even though 8,000 legal service firms might have delinked with the JSs, 
many of them were actually still operating jointly with the JSs. That sort 
of mutual dependent and supplementary relationship would be a necessary 
measure to consolidate and strengthen justice administration at the grass-
                                                          
5 William Alford and Fu Hualing 
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roots level …  the  conditions   to   implement   the policy of separating legal 
service firms and JSs in a large scale do not exist.6  
 
Principal problems with delinking as identified by the MoJ were: 1) lack of necessary 
personnel to work in JSs; and 2) a severe shortage of necessary and stable financial 
resources and supports. The MoJ insisted the delinking should be conditioned on the 
healthy development of JSs. However, the policy reversal was not enough to stop a 
continuing decline. By the end of 2003, legal service firms were reduced to 20,771, and 
the number of legal workers decreased to approximately 70,000.  
 
In 2003, the MoJ abandoned the privatization policy and announced that township legal 
service firms will become a pro bono community legal service organizations, which 
provide public interest-oriented, convenient, and affordable legal service that are 
jurisdiction-based and under the guidance and support of the government at the Street 
Office level. Unfortunately this new policy initiative has remained largely empty talk. 
The guiding principles of the MoJ toward legal workers were to restrict its development 
in the short term and abolish the whole profession in the long term, as reflected in various 
policy statements. 7 
 
What became fatal to sustaining the spread and health of legal service firms was the 2003 
Administrative Licensing Law which provides that no ministerial Measures could 
authorize a Ministry to approve a license/permission. Accordingly, the MoJ is not 
competent to establish legal service firms and the profession of legal workers. The 
Administrative Licensing Law took effect on 1 July 2004. On 19 May 2004, the State 
Council promulgated the Decision on the Third Batch of Administrative Approval Items 
to be Abolished or Adjusted, which made it unlawful for the MoJ to approve legal service 
                                                          
6 MoJ Statements (On file with the author).  
7 One policy statement states:  “gradual  abolition,  treating  from  cities  and  withdrawing  from  litigation”.  
There is also a 12 character-policy: limited development, gradual diminishment and eventual 
disappearance.  
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firms and issue licenses to legal workers.8  Since then, the legal service firms have been 
placed in a legal limbo. No national examination for legal service workers has been 
conducted since 2000. Even local BoJs have been admitting legal workers on an ad hoc 
basis only.  
  
The JSs, on the other hand, received a significant boost in 2003 and 2004. The central 
government raised 400 million RMB to build one separate office building for the JS in 
each township in central and western China. The JSs expanded quickly in terms of 
personnel and support as a result of the financial booster. As heads of JSs recounted their 
development:  
 
Our (legal service) firm was established in 1988, there was only one room 
with one staff member; but now there are five rooms for two staff 
members. Also, the Station has one computer, two motorcycles and one 
television set. Much of the hardware of the Station have been 
refurnished   …   The   quality   of   the   newly-recruited staff members has 
become higher and higher. From what I can see at this moment, this 
Station is operating well, and it can help solving some minor legal disputes 
in the locality. (HN039)     
 
This Justice Station was established by the Justice Bureau in 1988 
according to the request of the superior organ and the instruction of the 
government. At the time of its establishment, there was only one staff 
                                                          
8国务院关于第三批取消和调整行政审批项目的决定 
国发〔2004〕16号. The Decision cancelled 《基层法律服务工作者管理办法》（司法部令第 60号）
and《基层法律服务所管理办法》（司法部令第 59号）http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-
08/06/content_29614.htm 
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member who was concurrently serving as a government official. The 
working condition was poor: there was only one writing desk. When the 
Justice Bureau recruited civil servants in 2004, I was selected and 
transferred to this Justice Station. At this moment, the Justice Station has 
five rooms. (HN042)       
 
By the end of 2007, China had almost 41,000 JSs with almost 100,000 staff members.9  
 
Because of the development of JSs, legal service firms were (re) merged into JSs in 2004, 
this trend of re-integration with JSs was very visible in Hunan and Chongqing. Currently, 
there are three types of institutional arrangements between JSs and legal service firms. 
First, there are the lone JSs in townships in which the JA performs the two different 
functions as government mediator and private legal service provider. Second, and on the 
other extreme of the spectrum, there are independent firms which admit no relationship 
with the JSs. Third, a sizable minority of legal service firms continue to work within the 
JS facilities and are allowed to share the office space for free. But there is now a more 
visible division of labor than before where the JA performs the public function and legal 
workers focus on their private practices. In exchange for the free office space, the legal 
workers would contribute a proportion of their income to the JS. In addition, whenever 
there is a special need in the township, such as legal propaganda, teaching a law class in a 
local high school or provision of legal consultation, legal workers are expected to play a 
role (CQ03; CQ08).  
 
Theoretically, JAs, as civil servants, are no longer allowed to work as legal workers on a 
fee-charging basis (with the exception of  legal  aid  cases).  In  practice,  “moonlighting”  as  
legal workers is common among JAs because of a peculiar financial arrangement for the 
JA and his office. While the JA is paid as a civil servant directly through the county 
budget, there is no operational budget for his office. This peculiar financial position 
makes moonlighting as legal workers a necessity.  
                                                          
9 Yu Nayang,  “Justice  stations  are  in  the  frontline  of  solving  conflicts,   there  are  40,000   justice stations in 
the country”, Xinhuanet, 1 October 2007, available at the Website of Mengcheng County Justice Bureau, 
<http://www.mcsfj.gov.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=642> (Visited on 26 April 2010).  
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It is a well known fact that the JS can generate decent income through providing legal 
services. Realizing the possibility of moonlighting, the BoJ became predatory and 
required an annual contribution be paid as a condition of the appointment as a JA. With 
this,  profits  driving  became  a  core  (and  official)  component  of  a  JA’s  duty.  The  common  
practice is to request a JS to generate a quota of fees to be submitted to the BoJ on an 
annual basis. In one Chongqing township, a JS was requested to send 8,500 RMB,10 or 
over 10,000 RMB if taxes and fees are included. Anything beyond the quota is pocketed 
by the JA, and in this particular township, the JA was able to keep 7,000 RMB to 8,000 
RMB per year after meeting the quota. In Chongqing, Sichuan and Hunan, the annual 
fees imposed on JSs ranges from 4,000 RMB to 9,000 RMB, and the fee is imposed on 
each individual legal worker. Where there is more than one legal worker in the JS, the 
BoJ may impose fees on each of them. In a Sichuan JS, the BoJ imposes a fee of 4,500 
RMB on the director and 4,000 RMB on another legal worker (HR01). The BoJ in turn 
may provide some transportation subsidies of a few hundred RMB and reimburse certain 
expenses of the JS (HR01).  
 
Generally speaking, the delinking that took place around 2000 was regarded as 
detrimental to the development of legal service firms because the firms were forced to 
compete   in   the  market   and   “pay   for   its   own   income   and   expenses.”  As   a   result   “legal 
service firms  started  to  decline  gradually”  (HN031) in quantity and the quality of services 
provided. The 2004 reversal of the policy, on the other hand, was naturally regarded as a 
restoration of hope (HN027).11  
 
Grass-roots lawyers have related to the local government in different ways, with different 
degrees of political embeddedness in, and economic dependence on, the local 
                                                          
10 The figure was said to be decided by the BoJ chief on a dinner table while drinking (HR05). 
11 For a critical review of the development, see, Alford, William P. "'Second Lawyers,' First Principles: 
Lawyers, Rice-Roots Legal Workers, and the Battle Over Legal Professionalism in China" in Prospects for 
Professionalism in China: Essays on Civic Vocations (William P. Alford, Kenneth Winston & William C. 
Kirby eds., Routledge, 2009). 
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bureaucratic system. Some work for the government as civil servants while others have 
become self-reliant economically and independent professionally. But there is a large size 
of bare-foot lawyers who survive, innovatively, in a space between the government and 
society. Those lawyers receive support, tangible or intangible, from the BoJ or the 
township government, and on top of that, earn a legal fee by providing legal services.  It 
is in that policy and institutional context that we discuss legal services in rural areas in 
China.   
 
Grass-roots Lawyering  
 
In  China’s  rural  governance,  there  is a two-tiered dispute resolution mechanism. Village 
is the basic unit of rural governance and a village authority, the Villagers Committee is 
expected to resolve most of the disputes and to refer only the more contentious ones to 
the authority at the township   level.   “Trivial   things   would   not   leave   the   village”   has  
always been the prevailing policy, and most of the disputes are regarded as trivial. 
Increasingly, disputes have escaped the mediation network at the village level and surface 
at the township for the JAs and legal workers to handle. Several reasons explain the shift 
of JAs from a coordinator of mediation to a chief mediator.  
 
Firstly, there is a visible escalation of dispute and aggrieved individuals have brought 
their disputes to the attention of higher authorities. The traditional disputes between rural 
households gave way to public disputes in which peasants’   resisted to illicit levies 
imposed by or through village leaders in the 1990s and later to land disputes including 
land takings cases in the 2000s. Village leaders were deeply involved in the dispute with 
peasants they sought to represent and are parties to the disputes they are expected to 
resolve. Private village disputes, which were previously contained and internalized in 
villages, have now surfaced at the township level or above, appearing in the form of 
dispute between peasants as a collective and village governments. Township authorities, 
represented by the JAs, become the most immediately available third party mediator with 
a degree of neutrality.  
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The second cause is the incentive provided by the harmonious society initiative of the 
Hu-Wen government. The harmonious society doctrine equates a dispute to the sign of 
social instability and requires the relevant government to prevent the dispute from 
occurring or from escalating after it had occurred. The harmonious society initiative 
places heavy burdens on local officials to contain local disputes by using both sticks and 
carrots. Sticks are used in extreme cases of potential or actual petitions to higher 
authorities in the provincial capital or Beijing in which cases the JAs together with the 
local police would have to bring the petitioners back (HR03; HR04). During major 
holidays, JAs would have to ensure potential petitioners are under control; they may even 
put the petitioners under detention in the names of inviting them to  attend  “study  class”  or  
“training”   (HR03;;  HR04).  With the increase in stability fund, township governments is 
encouraged to use monetary payment to placate disputants. While there is nothing new 
about silencing disputants through payment, 
 
But for other disputes, local governments are willing to make unprincipled concessions to 
create social harmony. In handling such claims, police are instructed to withhold their 
coercive powers, and the township governments, with the participation of JAs and legal 
workers, would organize intensive mediation to contract a settlement, often trying their 
best to satisfy the demand of claimants. In doing so, however, the township governments 
are inviting claims, even apparently outrageous ones, from potential claimants (HR02; 
HR03). The  system  has  created  a  new  form  of  “moral  hazard”.        
 
Finally there is the demographic change. The initiation of market reforms in the urban 
economy created huge demand for cheap labor and drew millions of able-bodied and 
otherwise redundant peasants in the countryside to the cities as migrant labors. Estimated 
at between 150 million and 200 million at a daily count, migrant labor has been 
fundamental in generating the most controversial social problems in Chinese cities since 
the earlier 1990s. In Nan County in Hunan, 250,000 to 300,000 persons among the 1.2 
million population left their homes to work in cities; in another county in Chongqing, 
approximately 400,000 persons among the 1.2 million population work as migrant 
workers.  
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While research abound on migrant labors and related social problems, they are city-
oriented, focusing on either their contributions to the urban economy and their suffering 
in cities. Until recently, the resultant social impact on rural social structure has largely 
been neglected and we are only beginning to understand the social problems that have 
been created by the family breaking-down, the hollowing-out of rural community  and the 
thinning of village social organizations.  
  
 
Before discussing the style of lawyering of legal workers and explaining why they may 
have developed that particular style, it is important to review their personal background. 
Among the 43 legal workers interviewed in Hunan, 20 have a university degree (大学本
科) which has been achieved through mainly through distance learning; 19 have higher 
diplomas, a three year programme, (大专) (again achieved through different ways); one 
with a diploma, a two year programme (中专); two at the level of senior high school (高
中); and one with only a junior high school certificate (初中). 
  
Among   these   43   legal   workers,   three   of   them   have   lawyer’s   qualification   and   another 
seven have passed the national judicial examination. One interesting observation is that 
legal workers generally underestimate the education background of their fellow legal 
workers with the general views being that most of them had a high diploma only.  
 
Legal workers are also experienced. Of the 43 legal workers interviewed, 34 have told us 
their occupation prior to becoming a legal service worker. Among them, nine joined the 
legal service firms immediately after graduation, three were teachers, one engaged in 
business and three were civil servants. Five legal workers held positions in their 
respective villages prior to becoming legal service workers, such as: member of the 
village’s  mediation  committee; director of the village committee; Party secretary of the 
village; and town/township cadre and village official.  
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Interestingly, nine legal workers they had prior legal experiences, mostly at the township 
level, before becoming a legal worker. Again, legal workers, and for this matter, lawyers 
and BoJ officials, underestimated the prior legal knowledge of their fellow legal workers, 
with the mainstream view being that legal workers simply joined the legal service firms 
and then learnt the law on the job before obtaining the Practice Certificate (HN016).  
 
The profession of legal workers is steadily developing. Among the 43 legal workers 
interviewed in Hunan, 41 indicated the years of practice, with the shortest period of 
practice being for two years and the longest being 23 years. Below is the breakdown by 
years of practice:   
Year of Practice  Number of Legal Workers 
2-5 Years 14 (34.1%) 
6-10 Years 12 (29.3%) 
11-19 Years 9 (22%) 
Over 20 Years 6 (14.6%) 
 
On the other hand, lawyers are more stable and experienced. Among the 36 lawyers 
interviewed in Hunan, the shortest period of practice is one year, and the longest period is 
26 years. Below is the breakdown of the 36 lawyers by period of practice:  
Year of Practice No. of Lawyers 
1-5 Years 5 (13.9%) 
6-10 Years 12 (33.3%) 
11-19 Years 15 (41.7%) 
Over 20 Years 4 (11.1%) 
 
Geographic barriers are the foremost constraint operating to limit accessibility of legal 
services. Legal establishment clusters in cities, and the institutional presence of law in the 
countryside, until the most recent decade, is rare. Law firms, as a matter of rule, are all 
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located in county seats and are unlikely to re-locate to the townships. Indeed, as will be 
discussed, legal service firms themselves are moving up the ladder with small firms 
merging into larger ones and then they move to the county seat. Lawyers from the county 
seats are outsiders to villagers and are not familiar with the local environment. They are 
generally perceived as unable and unwilling to take on rural cases (CG05).  
 
The township legal workers are normally the first port of call when villagers take their 
disputes out of their villages. Legal workers, because of their spatial and social proximity 
to the villagers, are the first recipients of cases. When a dispute takes place and 
immediate responses are called for, lawyers are not available. But legal workers are 
always there and, similar to police response to a crime scene, can take on cases on the site. 
Naturally the legal workers will also provide the follow-up legal service (CQ07). This 
geographic advantage largely explains the fact that legal workers often have more cases, 
number wise, than lawyers. It is common ground that legal workers take on more village-
based cases, though small in monetary terms, than lawyers. The comment of a legal 
worker is representative of the common view:  
 
In the rural areas, legal service firms have greater advantages than law 
firms in case-hunting. This is mainly because the legal service firms are 
located near villages, their services are more convenient [to the villagers], 
and their charges are also relatively lower. (HN014)     
 
Proximity creates familiarity. Legal workers generally confirmed that most of the cases 
came to them because of their personal network in the locality (i.e. referred either by 
family members, friends, or other people they are familiar with) and the reputation they 
won among the former clients.12 According to one legal worker: 
 
Concerning case-hunting in rural areas, legal service firms are in a better 
position. People in the same locality are familiar with each other, people 
                                                          
12 These were said by interviewees in HN019; HN032; and HN042. The interviewee in HN016 also said 
that cases came to him mainly because of his reputation, and additionally, some cases were referred to him 
by his friends.  
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have greater trust [in legal service firms] and the fees [of the legal service 
firms] are also lower. (HN030)  
 
Affordable service is definitely an attraction. Legal workers are willing to take on cases 
that lawyers would not look at because of the little income they may be able to generate. 
Legal workers charge a lesser fee than lawyers according to the fee scale determined by 
the provincial Justice Department and the pricing authority. While there is a fee scale to 
follow, which is also posted in the offices of the legal service firms, legal workers, as a 
matter of rule, negotiate their fees with clients in individual cases. In general, the ability 
to pay is limited among rural clients, and legal workers are able to manage their own 
expectation. 13 To a large extent, the fee that a legal worker may charge depends on the 
financial condition of the client and the level of acquaintance between a legal worker and 
the client (HN009). Since most of the clients are not well-off, fees are normally lower 
than the fee scale permits (HN018). Legal workers constantly adjusted their fees to 
affordability so that fees are regarded as reasonable to the villagers and from time to time 
only a nominal fee is charged (HN024). 
 
Personal relations with the clients are another factor in determining fees which works to 
lower legal fees (HN011). Since the community in which a legal worker practices is small 
and people are familiar with each other, fees have to be lowered or even wavered. One 
legal worker claimed that because of personal relationship, he would have to waive fees 
for all the non-litigation work (HN012). Other factors that would be taken into account in 
fee negotiation include the amount involved in a case, the complexity of the case, and the 
likely cost to be incurred in handling the case (HN019). 
 
Legal workers, especially those who serve as JA in the township government, are deeply 
embedded in the local political system14 and embedment also works to enhance their 
competitiveness  in  the  legal  market.  Liu  pointed  out  a  “symbiotic”  relationship  between  
                                                          
13  Legal workers spend much less in case-handling and their life style also reduces the cost of practice. In 
one  example  cited  in  Fu’s  research in 2006, a legal worker who spent more than one week in Hangzhou in 
handling a personal injury case incurred less than 200 RMB on food, accommodation and transportation in 
the city (p.161).  
14 Michelson, 2009. 
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legal workers and local governments.15 The JA is appointed by the BoJ to work in a 
township. Once the appointment is made, the county BoJ has little control over his 
performance, and the BoJ gives little support neither. The work that the JA does is mostly 
locally oriented and involves mostly local interests. As such, his work relies on the 
support of township authorities, especially financial support.  
 
The JA is well aware of these political dynamics and the need to strike a proper balance 
in his political loyalty. For example, Director Mo learned his lesson in a hard way. The 
township government was occupying an office that belonged to the JS. Mo had 
repeatedly requested the township government to move away, and therefore offended the 
local government. The Township  Party  Secretary  went  to  the  BoJ  to  complain  about  Mo’s  
lack of cooperation at work and asked for a replacement. The township also imposed its 
ultimate punishment: refusing to give Mo his year-end bonus because Mo was not, de 
jure, part of the township government. Mo did not get anything from the BoJ either 
because he was not, de facto, part of the BoJ (HR01). A similar experience was shared by 
another JA whose 2,000 RMB year-end bonus was withheld by a deputy Party Secretary 
(HR02). Mo was later on moved to another JS, improved his relation with the township 
government, and was able to receive 1,000 RMB per year (HR01).  
 
Even legal workers who are not government officials, work closely with the township 
government. While officially independent of the township government or any 
government for that matter, they are still regarded in many ways as part of the township 
government establishment and perform duties as required. As one legal service firm 
director puts it:  
 
Township Party and government treat the legal service firms as a part of 
its establishment. Whenever there are meetings, the bigger ones, I mean 
persons in charge of legal service firms, would be invited to attend. Under 
the current structure, as a unit within the jurisdiction, you should cooperate 
                                                          
15 Liu, 2010.  
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[with the local government] on matters relating to maintaining harmony. 
(CQ07)  
 
One legal worker complained that each of the five legal workers in his firm have to 
provide up to 300 legal consultations and mediation services per year upon the request of 
the township government for very little payment (CQ03). He continued:  
 
We do it in rotation. For me, I set up a consultation table on the street in 
the town to conduct legal propaganda on the 11th of every month. 
Sometimes I mediate disputes among neighbors on my own; and 
sometimes the government sends us to mediate some disputes and pay us 
10 or 20 RMB per case as cost. (CQ03) 
  
While legal workers are unwilling to volunteer their services if they have a choice, they 
realize that their free services may provide opportunities to generate business in the future. 
They also provide legitimacy. As one legal worker explained, provision of free legal 
services under the guidance of the government gives the impression that legal workers are 
good people who are trusted by the government (CQ03)  
  
Certainly legal workers also maintain close relations with local judges (at court branches) 
and other legal personnel. The JAs and legal workers also work closely with township 
police in mediating disputes. Legal service firms and court branches were often located 
next to each other. Although there is a requirement that they must be separated by at least 
100 meters, the enforcement has not been strict. Judges and legal workers associate with 
each other in the open: 
 
Distant or not, there are that few people around. We play cards together 
frequently and ordinary people can see it. (CQ07) 
 
Judges are said to refer cases to legal workers and also provide guidance on legal issues.  
County lawyers are highly critical of this   sort   of   “unethical”   and   “corrupt”   dealing  
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between legal workers and judges, alleging that judges may have taken bribes from legal 
workers and are biased for them in their decision-making. Legal workers are, of course, 
sensitive to this question, insisting that their dealing   with   judges   are   “normal”   and 
“lawful”.   
 
Legal  workers  also  work  closely  with  villagers’  committees  which  may  from  time  to  time  
refer cases to them.  
 
…   most   of   the   villagers,   after   having   sought   the   assistance   from   the  
villagers’   committee, would be referred by the committee to a legal 
service firm. But for relatively big cases, they normally would go to the 
law firms. (HN013; HN028)  
 
A significant difference between lawyers and legal workers, that has been frequently 
highlighted, lies in their different style of lawyering. It is common ground between 
lawyers and legal workers that the latter are more hard-working, down to earth, and have 
a personal touch in their work. Legal workers can offer a more timely, affordable and 
responsive legal service and because of those qualities, they are regarded generally as 
more trustworthy.  
 
Legal workers at the grass-roots level know the family conditions of the 
parties, including the personality and character of the family members, 
their strength and flaws, [the difference between lawyers and legal 
workers is] similar to the difference between county level cadres and 
township level cadres. They know how to treat different people 
differently  …  that  familiarity  is  beneficial  to  mediation.  (CQ07)   
 
Compared with lawyers, we have much closer contact with the masses – 
there   is   a  human   tendency   to   trust   one’s   fellows   from   the   same   locality.  
We have higher level of trust which is accumulated over time. (CQ03)  
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Given their geographic proximity to villages, their familiarity with local circumstances 
and people, the affordable services, and political embedment, legal workers believe 
strongly that people seek their services on the basis of the trust that villagers place in 
them. A thread that runs through the interviews among legal workers is the assertion that 
legal  workers,   in   the   eyes  of   their   clients,   are   “trustworthy”   (HN016);;   are  given  “great  
trust  by  the  people”  (HN027), reliable and can be counted on.  
 
The trust is personal in the sense that clients contact an individual legal worker, referred 
to by a mutual friend, instead of walking into the law firm (CG04).  
 
We could engage in chats with ordinary people, smoking together and 
mingling  casually  … We are not pretentious. On the contrary, lawyers are 
stationed in the county seat. Not being rooted in the countryside, they are 
distant   from   ordinary   people   [who   become]…nervous   when   they   meet  
with county lawyers as if they are facing an official. (CQ07) 
 
While lawyers are critical of the low level of legal knowledge among legal workers and 
complain about their often dismal professional standards, lawyers do appreciate the legal 
workers’  contribution  to  mediation  in  rural  areas  and   their work ethic. In our interviews 
with county lawyers in Hunan, lawyers praised legal workers for their warm and friendly 
attitude in case handling (HN035; HN036), their rich experience in working at the 
grassroots level (HN037), as well as their responsiveness and good skills in solving 
disputes (HN035; HN036; HN037). One lawyer said that:  
 
Although the legal workers need to improve the standard of their 
professional services, they have rich experience in working at the 
grassroots level, and they are also good at solving disputes. (HN037)   
 
A few lawyers even stated that they place high respect for legal workers, and are willing 
to learn from legal workers (HN004; HN026). For example, one senior lawyer said:  
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It is worth while for lawyers to learn from legal workers in terms of their 
enthusiasm and methods in case-hunting  …  (HN026)        
 
Interestingly, lawyers who have handled more rural cases tend to give more favourable, 
or at least more neutral, comments on legal workers. They are also less likely to give a 
wholesale condemnation of legal workers, appreciating the fact that there   are   “good  
apples”  and  “bad  apples”  among  the  legal  workers  who have little legal knowledge and 
poor ethic standard (HN14; HN17). 
 
For legal workers, their style of lawyering is different from that of underground lawyers 
(black lawyers) hence the identity of barefoot lawyers. The term underground lawyers  
commonly used to refer to those who practice law without any legal qualification. They 
are usually considered as people who have no legal skills but bragged about their guanxi 
with officials to deceive clients:  
 
There   is   one   female   black   lawyer   who   has   only   received   two   years’  
primary education and could only spend a few minutes to prepare claims. 
Relying on her personal network, she bragged to clients about her guanxi 
with courts, procuracy and the police  …  She  would   say   a   few  words   in  
courts to discharge her duty. (CG03)  
 
When challenged in courts, black lawyers would shout, yell, and when necessary, they 
would not hesitate to pick a fight, literally, with judges. Chinese law is liberal in its 
standing requirement and a black lawyer may therefore appear in court in the name of 
agent ad litem but charge a fee in secret. Black lawyers are often repeat players in courts 
and judges of course know who they are. However, because of their private guanxi, 
judges are often willing to turn a blind eye to this problem. (CQ03)   
 
Underground lawyers are also competitive in terms of their charges even in comparison 
with legal workers. They know the fee scales for lawyers and legal workers, and thus 
tactically ask the potential clients to be aware of their own cost-effectiveness. A 
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underground lawyer may charge as low as 20 RMB to 30 RMB for case, which is a small 
fraction of the fee to be charged by legal workers (CQ03), not to say lawyers.   
 
Legal workers are well aware of their limit and comparative advantage in comparison 
with county lawyers and take pride in their efforts to conduct thorough investigation. 
Their weakness in legal training is compensated for by their ability to gather evidence.   
 
We are willing to run errands. We know the geography of Nanping 
Township, and sometimes it takes half a day just to reach the clients to 
understand their difficulties. (CQ05)  
 
Director Zhang was harsh on lawyers while praising legal workers for their diligence and 
their willingness to travel long distance to gather evidence no matter how small a case is: 
 
Some lawyers speak nonsense in courts. They have little evidence and are 
not objective. They performed for their clients in the court rooms but 
cannot persuade judges”.  (CQ07)   
 
For  him,  “sound evidence is better than the empty words coming out from the mouths of 
lawyers;;   without   evidence,   lawyers   become   useless   no   matter   how   skillful   they   are.”  
(CQ07) 
 
Because of the type of clientele and the nature of cases that legal workers face, legal 
workers have to be more proactive, investigative and hard-working. Clients who 
approach legal workers are people who have a lower level of legal knowledge, lack 
economic resources (many of them are actually legal aid applicants16), and are more 
reliant on the third party to gather evidence. The disputes that the clients face tend to 
involve little, if any, written documents which can be used as evidence. They are the 
                                                          
16 As disclosed by some Hunan legal workers being interviewed (e.g. HN014; HN015; HN017), many of 
the   cases   they   handle   are   legal   aid   cases   referred   to   them   by   the   justice   bureau:   “Litigation   involving  
migrant   workers   is   mainly   legal   aid   cases.   That   type   of   cases   is   referred   to   us   by   the   justice   bureau.”    
(HN014) 
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more traditional civil cases which require proactive investigation. Rural clients with 
limited resources place more reliance on their services providers.  
 
Another major difference is the fact that legal workers use mediation more often than 
lawyers in helping clients to settle disputes. Legal workers understand local 
circumstances and customs, but possess less substantive legal knowledge and therefore 
rely more on extra-legal persuasion in handling cases. Legal workers tend to be less rules 
and procedure oriented and thus more informal (CQ04; CQ05).  
 
Ironically, the informal   working   style   indirectly   confirms   lawyers’   criticisms   and  
skepticism that legal workers do not know the law and do not follow rules and procedures. 
Legal workers, because of their knowledge structure, may prefer the more open-ended 
mediation rather than rely on legal argument. But of course, mediation is also more time-
consuming in persuading parties involved to reach a settlement and the prevalent use of 
mediation also explains why legal workers have to be more hard-working. 
 
Mediation in the Chinese context is often conducted in the shadow of government 
authorities. This is natural, given the fact that the separation between the government JAs 
and the private legal workers is recent and incomplete. Mediation remains the primary 
task of JAs, and given the influence of the JAs on rural legal service in many places, legal 
workers take part in mediation with or without a fee.  
 
The preference to settle is also related to the limits of the profession and financial 
implications. The profession of legal workers does not have a clear legal status and the 
extent to which judges allow their legal representation in courts varies according to time 
and place. The legitimacy, if not legality, of legal workers is not questioned in their home 
jurisdictions (the county) when legal workers represent cases at trial of the first instance. 
But their legality could be challenged outside their respective counties when a case, for 
example, is appealed to the intermediate court in the city. In Chongqing, a legal worker 
recalled his experienced when he was stopped at the gate in the Chongqing intermediate 
people’s  court  and  the  guard  refused  to  accept  the  legal  worker  certificate  as  a legitimate 
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paper for entering the court (CQ08). 17  The majority of legal workers claim the 
experiences of discrimination during work. Indeed, when legal workers venture out to the 
coastal cities to represent their fellow villagers, they act as the agent ad litem not as legal 
workers to avoid any complications.  
 
Because of this particular uncertainty when a case goes to a trial (compounded by the 
weak litigation skills and legal knowledge), legal workers have a tendency to settle a 
dispute where possible. Lawyers, on the other hand, tend to solve cases through the 
litigation process because of their ability to control the development of a case and the 
consequent economic incentives (CQ05). 
 
The types of cases that legal workers encounter tend to be more suitable to settlement. 
They are the traditional civil law disputes in which parties, within the family or among 
neighbors, have developed a long standing relationship and are mutually dependent. It is 
particular worth noting that the largest number of cases by far in both Hunan and 
Chongqing involve divorce petitions. Divorce counts for 40 to 45 per cent of the case 
load of a legal service firm in general (CQ03); in one township in Chongqing, one legal 
service firm accepted more than 70 divorce cases in 2009 (CQ04). 
 
A more fundamental reason is that parties go to the JS or legal service firms more for 
help than for justice. Many cases are surfacing at the township level due to the 
diminished capacity of rural villages to internalize and resolve disputes within the 
villages and the reduced capacity of self-help among the parties. As mentioned earlier, 
the shortage of able-bodied persons in villages have weakened the self-regulatory 
capacity. When young and middle-aged persons leave villages, the able third parties who 
could have intervened in disputes and offer solution vanish. Many of the disputes which 
were within the jurisdiction of village leaders are now coming to the attention of JAs and 
legal workers. Without effective help, disputants bring the problems to the township and 
are channeled to the JA and legal service firms, thus effectively converting family 
                                                          
17 Liu Sida also observed that high level court judges are much more hostile to legal workers. Liu, note 11 
above.   
 26 
quarrels (e.g. family members fought fiercely over a few hundred RMB) (CQ08)) and 
disagreements among neighbors into a legal dispute to be resolved by a legal solution. 
Many aggrieved persons may not, however, be seeking justice in courts but, rather, they 
are seeking a suitable a third party who is willing to educate and discipline an abusive 
husband or an impious son, or handle private matters which the parties may not want to 
publicize (CQ08). The lack of internal assistance from within the village makes law the 
first resort of disputes and mediation may be the best solution.  
 
The Lure of Professionalism  
 
Legal workers work in a hostile legal environment and have been facing one existential 
crisis one after another. Lawyers with their academic and government supporters 
launched their own assault on legal workers in the early 1990s and lobbied the 
government to restrict the practice of legal workers to non-litigation work. When the 
Lawyers Law — the first law on the legal profession in China — was passed in 1996, it 
prohibited anyone without a practicing certificate from representing a party in litigation 
for profit-making purposes.18 Thus, a legal worker might continue to represent parties in 
courts, but fee-charging became illegal.   
 
This restriction never worked, however. The MoJ, realizing the indispensable role of 
legal workers in providing legal service in rural China, restored the right of legal workers 
to represent clients in courts through an executive measure issued, also in 1996.  What 
followed was a ten-year struggle between lawyers and legal workers, with courts playing 
an   important   role   in   policing   the   implementation   of   the   Lawyers   Law.   Lawyers’  
criticisms against the legal workers have become more acute after the introduction of the 
national judicial exam in 2002. Their question naturally becomes: why take the exam 
with a low passing rate, and pay all the fees and taxes as licensed lawyers, if one can 
become a de facto lawyer through the legal worker back door?  
 
                                                          
18 Lawyers  Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (1996),  Article  14.   
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Lawyers again lobbied for further law reform to clarify the matter and tighten the rules 
against legal workers. In 2007, the Lawyers Law was amended. Article 13 of the 
amended law reads:  
 
A  person  who  has  not  acquired  a   lawyer’s  practicing  certificate  shall  not  
be engaged in legal service practices in the name of lawyer; and, except as 
otherwise provided for by law, shall not be engaged in a practice of 
representation or defense in litigation. 
 
The exception under the law is confined to agent ad litem who provide legal 
representation for  free.  Clearly,  the  National  People’s  Congress  recognized  the  important  
role of legal workers in providing (rural) legal service but decided to remove them and 
“black”  lawyers  from  the  litigation  market  once  for  all.  But  legal  workers  are  paying  no  
attention to this amended Lawyers Law. 
 
Legal service firms do not provide a future for the younger, more ambitious legal workers 
who joined legal service firms in recent years, but law firms do. Most of the legal 
workers that we surveyed either have obtained a University degree or have studied law at 
a sub-degree level with a diploma or high diploma. The informal recruitment by BoJs that 
is currently on-going actually places such a minimum legal educational requirement for 
newly admitted legal workers. Once admitted as legal workers, they continue to study, on 
a part-time basis, for the undergraduate law degree which will qualify them for the 
national judicial exam. The incentive is obvious: 
 
For myself, I am also self-studying LLB and will try to obtain the 
qualification  to  take  the  judicial  exams…so  that  my  fees  will  increase  and  
I can also do legal representation in criminal cases. (CQ08)    
 
China’s  legal  education  has  been  geared  to  the  lower  level  of  the   legal service providers 
at least number-wise. Chinese law schools have produced millions of graduates in their 
sub-degrees programs through all imaginable means, including various long distance 
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learning, self-study, and part-time programs. Those education programs are having their 
impact and their graduates are playing an instrumental role in staffing the lower tier legal 
service in rural China. Law schools in China are also offering hope for the lower end 
graduates – who can top-up and graduate with a university degree after further continuous 
studies. 
 
There are incentives for legal workers to continue their studies, to pass the national 
judicial exam and to qualify as lawyers. There is indeed a continuous supply of lawyers 
arising from legal service firms as young legal workers pass the national judicial exams 
from time to time in both Chongqing and Hunan. When discussing the relationship 
between lawyers and legal workers, legal workers take pride in pointing out that legal 
workers in their firms have passed the judicial exams and moved to a law firm in the 
county seat. Undoubtedly, being a lawyer is the ultimate ambition for legal workers.  
 
In general, legal workers discuss lawyers with admiration. With some exceptions, most 
legal workers do appreciate the fact that lawyers are able to pass the difficult judicial 
exam and have achieved a more advanced level of legal knowledge and litigation skills. 
  
Lawyers, on the other hand, while respecting the work ethic and the personal touch in 
legal workers, resent legal workers precisely for their lack of legal knowledge. When it 
comes to the issue of legal knowledge and the observation of legal procedures in 
particular, county lawyers are highly critical of the poor quality of the legal workers and 
their services.19 Lawyers are generally of the opinion that legal workers do not possess 
comprehensive legal knowledge (HN001; HN006), and they are unprofessional and 
irresponsible in case handling.20 Some lawyers pointed out that, instead of following law 
and procedure, some legal workers only handle cases according to moral reasoning and 
their personal feeling (HN006; HN040). For example, one lawyer said that:  
 
                                                          
19 For example, comments of interviewees in HN011; HN027; HN031; HN038; HN039; HN040; HN041; 
HN042; and HN043 showed their strong criticism against the legal workers.  
20  This view was expressed by interviewees in HN009; HN013; HN014; HN017; HN037; and HN040.  
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I believe that [the legal workers] are still rather weak in legal knowledge, 
and more importantly, they only talk about moral reasoning but not law. 
(HN006)  
 
Because legal issues are not effectively tackled and procedures are not properly followed, 
disputes remained unsolved. As one senior lawyer commented:  
 
[The legal workers are] unprofessional, and there are still many problems 
left behind after they have finished handling a dispute. (HN038) 
  
Similarly, another also senior lawyer opinioned that:  
 
[I] consider that the quality of legal workers is relatively poor. They 
normally do not have any procedure in handling cases, and, comparatively 
speaking, fail to handle cases thoroughly. (HN039)    
 
Most lawyers lamented on the profession of the legal workers itself for the lack of a truly 
professional qualification;21 and the disruption in the legal service market legal workers 
have produced (HN022); and the perceived competition legal workers bring about. One 
lawyer with 14 years practicing experiences made the strongest attack on legal workers:  
 
Some legal workers pretend to be lawyers and handle cases as if they were 
lawyers in order to deceive the clients. What they do severely affects the 
lawyers’  image  in  the  society.  I  suggest  abolishing  of  the  abnormal  system  
of legal workers. (HN025)      
 
Interestingly, legal workers largely agree with the critique and demonstrate a strong 
inferiority complex. They agree that legal workers may be more affordable, but they are 
less authoritative. In particular, clients place more trust on qualified lawyers when the 
                                                          
21 For example, comments of interviewees in HN018; HN022; HN025 and HN040 reflected that this 
situation. 
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stake is high (CQ02) so that richer clients and bigger cases go to lawyers. Legal workers 
readily admit that they lack the advanced legal knowledge when compared with lawyers, 
and therefore constantly remind themselves of the need to improve.  
 
Legal workers largely accept this (often harsh) criticism and the profession itself is trying 
to prove its legitimacy and the “legality” of its existence by creating a lawyerly image. 
Legal workers are acting upon the criticisms to build up its legitimacy through self-
studies and on-job training to the degree. As one legal worker put it, if they do not 
enhance their level, there would be fewer cases coming their way (CQ01) and they may 
risk being abandoned (CQ2). 
 
While most of the legal workers are confident that they have a role to play in rural legal 
services, some of them are concerned with their future prospects: 
 
Most people working in legal service firms did not pass the judicial exam 
and their level [of legal knowledge] is limited. As the education level 
continues to rise and the legal system continues to develop, legal service 
firms will not have much role to play. We will all have to master some 
[legal] knowledge and there will be no room for someone who cannot pass 
the   judicial  exam  and  without   the   lawyer’s  qualification  and  who  cannot  
reach a high level [of legal knowledge]. (CQ01) 
 
The challenge from the lawyers has become more imminent with the expansion of law 
firms. In one county in Chongqing, legal service firms are on the decline because law 
firms are on the increase, and legal workers see this as a direct causal link (CQ02). Some 
legal workers take comfort in the fact that the number of lawyers is increasing only at a 
slow pace and there is a need for legal workers for the time-being. 
 
Given the inferiority complex and the eagerness to join the rank of lawyers, once a legal 
service firm is delinked and placed in the market place, it follows the same market rules 
as that which apply  to  lawyers.  First  of  all,  the  traditional  arrangement  of  “one-township-
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one-firm”  is  no   longer   feasible and a rural township simply could not sustain one legal 
service firm. Naturally, when the firm was pushed to the market, it vanishes and this 
explains the sudden drop of legal service firms in the immediate years after 2000 when 
the delinking was announced.  
 
Of course, the legal service firms do not simply vanish; they merge into larger firms and 
relocate to a large market town, especially where a court branch may be also located. In 
one extreme example in Chongqing, some 30 legal service firms were merged into a 
mega-firm which was located at the county seat. The major consideration was to create an 
economy of scale through the merging of firms, so that legal workers can cluster in a 
market town to receive and handle more cases with greater efficiency. For business 
reasons legal service firms, and law firms for this matter, have to cluster in certain 
geographic locations and to concentrate on commercial cases.     
 
Within the boundary of a county, the county seat is the ultimate source of business where 
major business takes place. As a matter of rule, at least one legal service firm would be 
located in the county seat or nearby. Once a legal service firm moves to the county seat, it 
competes directly with law firms. To survive in the market, legal service firms have to 
increase their competitiveness by recruiting capable and resourceful members. According 
to the director of a county seat legal service firm, after an adjustment in his firm by 
dismissing nine legal workers from his 18-membered teams: 
 
The remaining nine members are competitive and their performance is 
also  good…the  nine  legal  workers whom we have dismissed are weak in 
their case handling ability. Now the nine members are better than any 
other lawyer in case-hunting and case-handing ability. Most of them have 
been in practice since the 1990s and have served as directors in other legal 
service firms.  We   also   have   a   former   deputy   Chairman   of   the   county’s  
People’s  Congress  (retired)  and  a  former  deputy  police  chief  (retired).  We  
have a retired judge who worked in a branch tribunal for more than 10 
years. They are all properly licensed (as legal services firms). (CQ07) 
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The director was confident that similar dismissal may also take place among other legal 
service firms   in   the  county.  Otherwise,  “we  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  compete  with  
the  law  firms.”  (CQ07) 
 
The aim of competing with law firms in the same legal service market is apparent. 
Director Zhang insisted that it is possible to improve the quality of legal workers even if 
they have not passed the judicial examination:  
 
Although we have not passed the judicial examination, our familiarity with 
theoretical knowledge and our case-handling ability are as good as those 
of lawyers. (CQ07) 
 
Legal service firms have their own competitive edge against law firms. The formal legal 
profession is governed by a national standard and there is little local discretion. While not 
governed by any national standard, the legal service firms are effectively licensed and 
controlled at the county level. Since there is no longer any qualifying examination, the 
entrance to the profession of legal workers is controlled largely at the discretion of the 
BoJ. Because of this flexibility in qualification, legal workers are also subject to stronger 
control of the government and have been turned into sources of income of the BoJ.  
 
A potentially key difference between a law firm and a legal service firm lies in the degree 
of control, especially financial control that the BoJ may have over the two different firms. 
Law firms are relatively financially independent from the BoJ. But legal service firms are 
a different matter, and they have become a source of income for the bureaucrats in the 
BoJ. As a lawyer admitted:  
 
It can be said that legal service firms   are   run   by   the  BoJ  …  Practically  
speaking, legal service firms are subordinate organizations of, and directly 
administered by, the BoJ. (CQ02)  
 
 33 
In this process, legal service firms have lost their original identity. They have uprooted 
themselves from the countryside and have become more profit-driven, competing with 
lawyers in exactly the same market with the support and guidance of the BoJ. Their bread 
and butter cases are no longer those concerning the daily life of the peasants whom they 
have clearly abandoned, to a degree, when the firms have moved from the town to the 
county seats.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The geography of law matters greatly in both developed countries and developing 
countries for access to justice. Similar to the situations in other countries, economically 
advanced or not, the foremost barrier to adequate access to justice for villagers is the 
spatial distance between the world in which disputes take place and the world in which 
disputes can be resolved. While information technology and improvement in 
transportation may alleviate the problem to a degree, the ultimate solution is to deliver the 
services, and institutionalize the services, at the places where disputes occur. Sending law 
to the countryside therefore continues to be a necessity that is warmly welcomed. 
 
Rural legal service provision is unique and cannot be designed and assessed according to 
the urban standard where lawyers tend to cluster and authoritative third parties abound. A 
clear lesson is that, reliance on delivery of legal service by the private professions is 
unlikely to meet the legal needs in rural society. A private legal profession follows its 
own logic. The   profession’s   survival   may   depend   on   an   economy   of   scale,   and   firms  
follow where the business is: market towns and the county seats. Eventually law firms 
and legal service firms (when it is placed in the market) compete in the market for the 
same cases, distancing increasingly from their rural roots. 
 
A major barrier for the growth of legal service firms is their certain legal status. The MoJ 
has not been able to give a clear indication on the future of rural legal service in general, 
and legal service firms in particular. While the number of legal workers has started to 
increase again, legal workers have the impression that the government eventually would 
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let legal service firms die a natural death; without sufficient new blood coming into the 
profession, the profession of legal workers will be aged out of business.  
 
In the end, politics matters more than economics. Government initiatives can correct the 
market failure and alleviate the difficulties in providing meaningful access to public 
goods including legal services. The profession of legal workers emerged due to the fact 
they it could provide a service to rural communities that the market itself could not 
provide otherwise. The demand for these localized services is still there and the fact that 
existing legal workers are moving up the professional ladder and settling in county seats 
does not alleviate this demand. With certain policy support to create certainty, this 
profession can be sustained and new entrants can move in to fill the market demand left 
open when some legal workers abandon village markets. But to do that requires political 
vision and will.    
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